The European Union, Financial Regulation, Banking Union, Capital Markets Union and the UK - Working Paper SPERI by Quaglia, Lucia
This is an author produced version of The European Union, Financial Regulation, Banking 
Union, Capital Markets Union and the UK - Working Paper SPERI.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/116253/
Conference or Workshop Item:
Quaglia, Lucia orcid.org/0000-0001-8816-0583 (2017) The European Union, Financial 
Regulation, Banking Union, Capital Markets Union and the UK - Working Paper SPERI. In:
UNSPECIFIED. 
promoting access to
White Rose research papers
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
European Union 
Financial Regulation, 
Banking Union, 
Capital Markets Union 
and the UK.
Lucia Quaglia
SPERI Paper No. 38
ISSN 2052-000X 
Published in January 2017
  About the author
Lucia Quaglia (DPhil Sussex) is Professor of Political Science at 
the University of York. Prior to York, she was Senior Lecturer 
in Contemporary European Studies at the University of Sussex. 
Her most recent books include: (with D. Howarth) The Political 
Economy of Banking Union, Oxford University Press (2016); 
The European Union and Global Financial Regulation, Oxford 
University Press (2014). She was awarded research fellowships 
from the Hanse-Wissenschafts Kolleg, the University of Bremen, 
the Fonds National de la Recherche in Luxembourg, the Max 
Planck Institute in Cologne, the Scuola Normale Superiore and 
the European University Institute in Florence.
1SPERI Paper No. 38  European Union Financial Regulation, Banking Union, Capital Markets Union and the UK
Introduction
Ma^ >nkhi^Zg Ngbhg !>N" ng]^kmhhd fZchk k^_hkfl h_ bml ^\hghfb\ Zg] ¦gZg-
\bZe`ho^kgZg\^ _kZf^phkdZ_m^k ma^ bgm^kgZmbhgZe¦gZg\bZe\kblblZg] ma^lho^k-
eign debt crisis (for an overview, see Journal of Common Market Studies 2009; 
Review of International Political Economy 2015; and Journal of European Public 
Policy+)*."'Mak^^¦gZg\bZeiheb\rZk^ZllmZg]hnm3¦gZg\bZek^`neZmbhg%pab\apZl
lb`gb¦\Zgmerk^obl^]bgma^pZd^h_ma^bgm^kgZmbhgZe¦gZg\bZe\kblbl4;Zgdbg`Ngbhg
(BU), which was the EU (to be precise, the euro area)s response to the sovereign 
debt crisis; and Capital Markets Union (CMU), which was the EUs attempt to re-
oZfi¦gZg\bZeZ\mbobmb^lZg]ma^k^Ze^\hghfrZ_m^kmph\hgl^\nmbo^\kbl^l'Ma^l^
reforms were complex and intertwined. They built on the existing EU framework, 
ghmZ[erma^Lbg`e^?bgZg\bZeFZkd^mbgma^\Zl^h_¦gZg\bZek^`neZmbhgZg]<FN'Ma^
k^_hkfl^gZ\m^]Zelhln[lmZgmbZeerfh]b¦^]ma^^qblmbg`_kZf^phkd%Zlbgma^\Zl^
of BU, which was designed to complete Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
This paper examines the dynamics of EU reforms in these policy areas by focusing 
hgma^ik^_^k^g\^lZg]bg§n^g\^h_ma^Ngbm^]Dbg`]hf!ND"'Ma^NDaZlh_m^g
been considered as an awkward partner in the EU. Stephen Georges classic book, 
An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community (1990), points out the 
troubled relationship of the UK with the process of European integration since its 
inception. This paper argues that this view is somewhat unwarranted, especially 
bgma^\Zl^h_¦gZg\bZeiheb\b^l'Bgma^l^iheb\b^lma^NDaZl[^^gZ_hhm&]kZ``^k%Z
fence-sitter and a pace-setter, depending on the circumstances. The paper does 
not discuss in-depth the (often complex) intra-EU negotiations in these policy ar-
eas. At the same time, the domestic politics and political economy of these issues 
in the UK are not investigated in details. The aim of the paper is to explore how 
the EU policy-process and the domestic arena in the UK interacted and with what 
outcome. The material is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses some concepts 
maZm\Zg[^nl^_ne bghk]^kmh^qZfbg^ma^ik^_^k^g\^lZg]ma^ bg§n^g\^h_ ma^
member states in the EU policy-process. The empirical sections follow by and large 
Z\akhgheh`b\Zehk]^k%]bl\nllbg`>N¦gZg\bZek^`neZmbhg¦klm!L^\mbhg,"%ma^g;N
!L^\mbhg-"Zg]¦gZeer<FN!L^\mbhg."'
Member states in the EU policy process
This section discusses some concepts that are useful in order to examine the role 
h_ma^f^f[^klmZm^lbgma^>Niheb\rikh\^ll'Bm¦klmhnmebg^lZmriheh`rh_khe^l
and then examines the domestic process of national preference formation and the 
lhnk\^lh_bg§n^g\^_hkma^f^f[^klmZm^lbgma^>N'
A typology of roles 
In her seminal work, Boerzel (2002) distinguishes three roles that member states 
can perform in the EU policy process: foot-draggers, fence-sitters and pace-set-
ters. Foot-dragging takes place when a member state seeks to block, delay or sub-
lmZgmbZeerpZm^k]hpgZiheb\rf^Zlnk^Zmma^>Ne^o^e[^\Znl^bm]h^lghmk^§^\m
the preferences of that member state. Foot-dragging comes in two shades: opposi-
tion to the EU policy measure tout court; and partial foot-dragging by seeking to 
2SPERI Paper No. 38  European Union Financial Regulation, Banking Union, Capital Markets Union and the UK
substantially reshape the proposed EU measure. Partial foot-dragging is something 
that goes beyond the traditional processes of negotiation whereby member states 
l^^d%_hk^qZfie^%mh¦g^&mng^li^\b¦\ikhoblbhglh_>Ne^`bleZmbhg'Ma^_hhm&]kZ`-
gers are sometimes late-movers if they do not have domestic templates already 
in place in given policy areas, as in the case of Southern European countries and 
^gobkhgf^gmZeiheb\r!;h^ks^e+))+"'Ihlm¦gZg\bZe&\kblbl% ma^NDpZlZm mbf^lZ
_hhm&]kZ``^kbgma^k^_hkfh_>N¦gZg\bZek^`neZmbhg%Ze[^bmbg]b^k^gmpZrl%lhf^-
times calling for stricter EU regulation, other times calling for less strict EU rules, 
as elaborated in Section 3. In other cases the UK was a foot-dragger tout court, 
seeking to prevent the enactment of an EU measure, as in the case of the Financial 
Transaction Tax (Gabor 2015; Wasserfallen 2014), which, however, was controver-
sial also for other member states.
Fence-sitting coincides with passive policy-taking, rather than active policy-mak-
ing. It takes place if a member state does not have strong preferences on the EU 
measure under discussion or does not have the capacity to engage substantially in 
negotiations. Hence, the fence-sitter can build tactical coalitions with pace-setters 
and foot-draggers (Boerzel 2002). Often fence-sitters adopt a wait and see ap-
proach. The Nordic countries in EMU are examples of this dynamic. At the time of 
the Maastricht Treaty, the UK sought to block EMU (Dyson and Featherstone 1999): 
hence it was a foot-dragger, rather than a fence-sitter. Member states can also be 
constructive fence-sitters by supporting in principle a given EU measure, but opt-
outing (de jure or de facto) and letting the others go ahead, as in the case of the UK 
in BU, which is discussed in Section 4.
Pace-setting takes place when a member state actively pushes for a certain policy 
f^Zlnk^Zmma^>Ne^o^ebgZpZrmaZmk^§^\mlbmlik^_^k^g\^l'Bmh_m^gik^lniihl^l
the presence of domestic policy templates to upload (in which case, the pace-set-
m^kblZelhZ¦klm&fho^k"Zg]ma^\ZiZ\bmrmh]hlh%pab\abgmnkgbl[Zl^]hgma^k^-
sources that a member state can mobilise. Typical examples of pace-setting are the 
Nordic countries and Germany in environmental policy (Borzel 2002); Germany in 
fZ\kh^\hghfb\iheb\b^l!=rlhg+)))"4Zg]ma^NDbgik^&\kblbl¦gZg\bZel^kob\^l
k^`neZmbhg%^li^\bZeerma^\hfie^mbhgh_ma^lbg`e^¦gZg\bZefZkd^m!Fë``^+)*)4
Posner and Veron 2010, Quaglia 2010). Post-crisis, the UK was a pace-setter in the 
building-up of CMU, as elaborated in Section 4. Other examples of the UKs pace-
setting role that are not examined in this paper due to space constraints are the 
NDlbff^]bZm^k^lihgl^mhma^bgm^kgZmbhgZe¦gZg\bZe\kblblZg]ma^g^`hmbZmbhgl
on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). In the midst of the 
¦gZg\bZe\kblbl%ma^lh&\Zee^] ;kbmblaieZgikhob]^]Z m^fieZm ^ _hkma^iheb\rk^-
sponse of the EU and its member states (see Quaglia 2009).  In external economic 
(trade) relations of the EU, the UK supported the Commission in the TTIP negotia-
mbhglpbmaZob^pmhikhfhmbg`ma^bg\enlbhgh_¦gZg\bZel^kob\^lbgmhma^Z`k^^f^gm
(Jones and Macartney 2016).
It is noteworthy that the adoption of one of these roles by a member state varies 
over time: the 1980s and 1990s were the golden age for the pace-setters on the 
Single Market and EMU (see Armstrong and Bulmer 1998; Egan 2001; Jabko 2006; 
Dyson and Featherstone 1999). There is variation across policy-areas: for exam-
ple, the UK is more likely to be a pace-setter in areas related to the Single Market 
than, for example, in social policy, from which it temporarily opted out (Falkner 
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2003). There is also variation within a policy area: the UK was very supportive of 
<FN4bmhiihl^]\^kmZbgib^\^l>Nihlm&\kblbl¦gZg\bZee^`bleZmbhg%ln\aZla^]`^
funds rules, but supported other measures, such as a new framework for bank 
k^lhenmbhg'Ma^ihebmb\ZeiZkmr!hkiZkmr\hZebmbhg" bgh\^hgerfbgbfZeerZ^\ml
these dynamics. For example, the UK was a Single Market pace-setter in the 1980s 
under the Conservative government (Moravcsik 1998), which was, however, a foot-
dragger on EMU in the same period (Dyson and Featherstone 1999). In the 1990s, 
ma^NDpZlZiZ\^&l^mm^kbgma^\hfie^mbhgh_ma^lbg`e^¦gZg\bZefZkd^m!Fë``^
2010; Posner and Veron 2010; Quaglia 2010) under the Labour government. With a 
Conservative government, the UK was a pace-setter in the making of CMU and the 
TTIP negotiations (Quaglia et al 2016), a fence-sitter on BU (Howarth and Quaglia 
+)*/"Zg]Z_hhm&]kZ``^khg\^kmZbgib^\^lh_>N¦gZg\bZel^kob\^le^`bleZmbhg!IZ-
gliari 2013; Quaglia 2012; Woll 2013).
The domestic process of national preference formation 
In order to explain why member states adopt one of the roles outlined above it 
is crucial to understand the domestic process of national preference formation 
pbmak^_^k^g\^mhli^\b¦\>Niheb\rZk^Zl'=hf^lmb\ihebmb\lZg]]hf^lmb\ihebmb-
cal economy interact in the formation of national preferences (e.g. Moravcsik 1997, 
1998), which are the aggregated preferences of the public authorities and private 
Z\mhklZmma^]hf^lmb\e^o^e'Ma^ik^_^k^g\^lh_ma^in[eb\Znmahkbmb^lZk^Z^\m^]
by the economic and political costs of the proposed measure for their country 
Zg]ma^eh[[rbg`^hkmlh_li^\b¦\bgm^k^lm`khnilbgma^]hf^lmb\Zk^gZ'GZmbhgZe
policy-makers might also be sensitive to the allocation of new powers to EU bodies, 
which might be a contested move in domestic politics, especially in some member 
states, such as the UK. 
The preferences of interest groups depend of the expected economic costs and 
[^g^¦ml h_ ma^ ikhihl^] >N f^Zlnk^% iZkmb\neZker ¦gZg\bZe iheb\b^l% pab\a aZo^
\e^Zk&\nm\hlmlZg][^g^¦ml'Ma^`khnilfhlmZ^\m^][rma^f^Zlnk^Zk^ebd^er
to mobilise the most, albeit subject to resource constraints (Mahoney 2007). Par-
mb\neZkerbfihkmZgmbgma^NDZk^ma^ik^_^k^g\^lh_ma^¦gZg\bZel^\mhk%ma^<bmrh_
Ehg]hg%`bo^gma^eZk`^lbs^h_ma^¦gZg\bZel^\mhkbgma^gZmbhgZe^\hghfr'Fhk^h-
o^k%ma^¦gZg\bZebg]nlmkraZlma^^ \hghfb\Zg]anfZgk^lhnk\^lmh[^Zg^ ^\mbo^
eh[[rblm!;Zd^k+)*)"'Ma^;kbmbla¦gZg\bZebg]nlmkr_heehpl\ehl^erZg]lrlm^fZmb-
cally contributes to the policy discussions on these matters at the national and EU 
e^o^el'Hgma^hg^aZg]%]b^k^gmiZkmh_ma^¦gZg\bZebg]nlmkraZo^lhf^mbf^l]b_-
ferent preferences (Pagliari and Young 2014) or certain issues are salient for some 
(e.g. hedge funds) but not for others (e.g. collective investment funds, on which see 
Phee+)*,"'Hgma^hma^kaZg]%hg^h_m^gli^Zdlh_ma^gZmbhgZe¦gZg\bZelrlm^f
!kZma^kmaZgcnlml^\mhk"[^\Znl^ma^oZkbhnliZkmlh_ma^gZmbhgZe¦gZg\bZebg]nl-
mkrZk^`^g^kZeerbgm^kebgd^]'Bg]^^]%ma^ebm^kZmnk^hgoZkb^mb^lh_¦gZg\bZe\ZibmZe-
blfl^^dlmhm^Zl^hnmmriheh`b^lhk\hffhg_^Zmnk^lh_gZmbhgZe¦gZg\bZelrlm^fl
(Allen and Gale 2000; Hardie and Howarth 2013).
Ma^lhnk\^lh_f^f[^klmZm^lbg§n^g\^
Ma^bg§n^g\^h_Zf^f[^klmZm^bgma^>NblZ^\m^][rZoZkb^mrh_lhnk\^l3^\h-
nomic and political power (such as GDP, votes in the Council); the size of the spe-
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\b¦\ l^\mhk ng]^k ]bl\nllbhg4 ln[c^\m&li^\b¦\ ^qi^kmbl^ Zg] `^g^kZe g^`hmbZmbg`
skills (for a review, see Bailer 2010). The UK is the third largest member state in 
ma^>Nbgm^kflh_@=I'Ng]^kma^\nkk^gmJnZeb¦^]FZchkbmrOhmbg`!JFO"kne^l
in the Council, the four largest member states (Germany, France, the UK and Italy), 
mh`^ma^kpbmaZgrhma^k>Nf^f[^klmZm^%aZo^ln\b^gmohm^lmh[eh\dZgrikh-
ihl^]ib^\^h_ e^`bleZmbhg'Ma^ND¦gZg\bZel^\mhk bl[r _Zkma^ eZk`^lm bgma^>N
Zg]Ehg]hgblma^eZk`^lm¦gZg\bZe\^gmk^bg>nkhi^Zg]ma^l^\hg]eZk`^lmbgma^
phke]'@bo^gma^lbs^h_ma^¦gZg\bZel^\mhk%ma^;kbmblaZnmahkbmb^laZo^\hglb]^k-
Z[e^ln[c^\m&li^\b¦\^qi^kmbl^hgfZmm^klk^eZm^]mh¦gZg\^'Ma^bg§n^g\^h_ma^
NDbg¦gZg\bZeiheb\b^laZl[^^g\hglb]^kZ[e^%`bo^gma^\hglib\nhnlk^lhnk\^lbm
can mobilise. 
Ma^ _heehpbg` ^fibkb\Ze l^\mbhgl ^qZfbg^ >N ihlm&\kblbl ¦gZg\bZe k^`neZmbhg% ;N
and CMU, explaining the dynamics of the EU policy process with a particular focus 
hgma^ik^_^k^g\^lZg]bg§n^g\^h_ma^ND%^qieZbgbg`parbmpZlZ_hhm&]kZ``^k%
fence-sitter, and pace-setter depending on the circumstances (for an overview, 
see Table 1).
  
MZ[e^*3Ho^kob^ph_ma^NDlkhe^lbgl^e^\m^]¦gZg\bZeiheb\b^lbgma^>N
Pace-setter
Pre-Crisis
Post-Crisis
Financial Services Action Plan, most EU legislation (e.g. Solvency II, 
Lamfalussy directives in securities markets)
British (Brown) plan, CMU, TTIP (inance), some EU legislation (BRRD)
Fence-sitter
Pre-Crisis
Post-Crisis
Stability and Growth Pact
BU, some EU legislation (e.g. EMIR)
Foot-dragger
Pre-Crisis
Post-Crisis
EMU-TEU
Most EU legislation (e.g. AIFM, FTT)
Ihlm&\kblbl>N¦gZg\bZek^`neZmbhg
:ahlmh_g^p¦gZg\bZee^`bleZmbhgpZlblln^][rma^>Nbgma^Z_m^kfZmah_ma^bgm^k-
gZmbhgZe¦gZg\bZe\kblbl'Ma^fZbgib^\^lh_e^`bleZmbhg_hkfZeerZ]him^][rma^>N
are listed in Table 1, which does not include the measures concerning BU, discussed 
in Section 4. The vast majority of these measures regulated activities or entities 
that were previously unregulated (or subject to self-regulation) in the EU and its 
member states such as credit rating agencies (CRAs); or at the EU level (such as 
hedge funds and bank resolution); or at the national, EU and international level 
(Over the Counter Derivatives (OTCDs)). In other instances, they imposed heavier, 
fhk^ik^l\kbimbo^Zg]fhk^[nk]^glhf^k^jnbk^f^gmlhg¦gZg\bZe^gmbmb^lmaZm
were already regulated prior to the crisis, as in the case of higher capital require-
ments for banks and new liquidity management rules (the Capital Requirements 
Directive IV, CRD IV), or they set in place more substantial protection for deposi-
tors (the revised Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive). Some of the post-crisis 
>Nkne^laZ]ihm^gmbZeikhm^\mbhgblm^^\ml]n^mhma^\hgm^gmbhnlikhoblbhgl\hg-
cerning the access of third-country entities or products to the EU market, for ex-
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ample in the legislation concerning credit rating agencies, hedge funds and OTCDs 
!JnZ`ebZ+)*."'Ma^k^_hkfh_ma^¦gZg\bZel^kob\^lZk\abm^\mnk^_heehpbg`ma^]^
EZkhlbÙk^K^ihkm!+))2"pZl]^lb`g^]mhlmk^g`ma^g¦gZg\bZelni^koblbhgZmma^
EU level and to foster macro-prudential supervision in the EU (Buckley and How-
arth 2011; Hennessy 2014). 
By looking at the entirety of EU post-crisis legislation, the UK was often a foot-
dragger, and less frequently a fence-sitter and a pace-setter. First, the UK was a 
foot-dragger concerning the legislation on hedge funds, rating agencies and the Fi-
nancial Transaction Tax. These pieces of legislation were resisted by the UK on the 
ground that they would impose unnecessary costs, damaging the competitiveness 
h_ ma^ ¦gZg\bZe bg]nlmkr bg >nkhi^ Zg] k^]n\bg` ma^ ZmmkZ\mbo^g^ll h_ >nkhi^Zg
¦gZg\bZe\^gmk^lZlZk^lnemh_k^`neZmhkrZk[bmkZ`^'Ma^NDlmk^ll^]maZm>N¦gZg-
cial regulation should support the development of open, global markets (Darling 
2009). The concern about international regulatory arbitrage has traditionally been 
at the forefront of policy-makers minds in Britain,  given the fact that London hosts 
fZgrghg&;kbmbla&hpg^]¦gZg\bZebglmbmnmbhglZg]ln\\^ll_neer\hfi^m^lpbmahma-
^k¦gZg\bZe\^gmk^lphke]pb]^mhZmmkZ\m[nlbg^ll!JnZ`ebZ+)*)"'
A combination of domestic politics and domestic political economy accounts for 
British preferences on the regulation of hedge funds, rating agencies and the Finan-
cial Transaction Tax. The UK hosts approximately 80% of all the EU hedge fund man-
agers and several non-EU hedge funds operate in London. The main CRAs that are 
based in North America use their subsidiaries in London in order to issue ratings 
Z\khllma^>N'Fhk^ho^k%¦gZg\bZeikh]n\mlmkZ]^]bgEhg]hgaZo^kZmbg`lblln^]
within and without the EU. Hence, EU legislation on hedge funds and CRAs de facto 
mainly hit the UK. Lord Myners, a UK Treasury minister in 2009, suggested that it 
was easy for other European countries to make political capital out of demanding 
intrusive regulation of an industry of which they have little or no direct experience 
(Financial Times, 1 July 2009). 
LbfbeZker%ma^?bgZg\bZeMkZglZ\mbhgMZqphne][^]^mkbf^gmZemhbgm^kgZmbhgZe¦gZg-
cial centers, such as the City of London and Wall Street, which mostly operate in 
the wholesale market (Financial Times, 23 September 2011; Reuters, 4 November 
2011). Indeed, several reports (House of Lords 2012; London Economics 2014) indi-
cated that up to 80% of the Financial Transaction Tax in the EU would be collected 
in the UK. Moreover, there was the possibility that part of the taxes collected in 
the UK would be transferred to the EU and/or shared with other EU countries that 
ahlm^]¦kfliZkmrmh¦gZg\bZemkZglZ\mbhglmZdbg`ieZ\^bgma^ND!Ahnl^h_Ehk]l
2012). The Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, went so far as to argue 
maZmma^¦gZg\bZemkZglZ\mbhgmZqblghmZmZqhg[Zgdlhk[Zgd^kl4bmblZmZqhgi^g-
sioners and people with savings and investments (BBC, 20 April 2013). Eventually, 
the UK brought the case before the European Court of Justice, which dismissed 
ma^\aZee^g`^Zlik^fZmnk^[^\Znl^ma^]^mZbelh_ma^mZqaZ]ghm[^^g¦gZebl^]
(Financial Times, 6 May 2014).
Finally, the UK was a partial foot-dragger in the negotiation of the CRD IV legislative 
package designed to implement the Basel III accord in the EU by replacing the old 
CRD III with a directive that governs the access to deposit-taking activities and a 
regulation that establishes prudential requirements for credit institutions. How-
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ever, in this case, unlike those of CRAs and hedge funds, the UK authorities resisted 
EU rules because they were regarded as not strict enough and not in line with Basel 
BBB!_hkZ]bl\nllbhgh_ma^fZbg]b^k^g\^l[^mp^^g;Zl^eBBBZg]ma^<K=BO%l^^
Howarth and Quaglia 2013). Speaking at a meeting of the Economic and Finance 
fbgblm^kla^e]mh]bl\nllma^<K=BO%ma^;kbmblaMk^Zlnkrfbgblm^kZkf^]maZmp^
are not implementing the Basel agreement, as anyone who will look at this text will 
be able to tell you (Financial Times, 2 May 2012). Indeed, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) subsequently found the EU materially non-compliant 
with Basel III (BCBS 2014). Moreover, the UK authorities and those who argued 
in favour of EU standards that exceed the Basel minimum successfully opposed 
the initial proposed for maximum capital ratio, which meant that national regula-
tors would not have been able to impose higher capital requirements on domestic 
banks should they have deemed it necessary to do so (James 2016). By contrast, an 
blln^hgpab\ama^NDZnmahkbmb^lehlmma^bk[Zmme^bg;knll^elZg]maZm]b^k^gmbZm^
the CRD IV package from the Basel accord was the legally binding cap imposed on 
banker bonuses. This had been an amendment introduced and strongly advocated 
by the European Parliament (EP) with some support from continental countries 
(Greenwood and Roederer-Rynning 2014). 
A combination of domestic politics and domestic political economy account for 
British preferences on the CRD IV (and Basel III) (see James 2016). At the time of 
the CRD IV negotiations, the main British banks were relatively well capitalised in 
part as a result of the state-led recapitalisation in the wake of the crisis, whereas 
the banks in many continental European countries were under-capitalised. The 
impact of stricter capital requirements on lending to the real economy was less 
of a concern for the UK because the City is mostly disconnected from the real 
economy in the UK. By contrast, continental European countries have a bank-based 
¦gZg\bZelrlm^f%pa^k^[Zgdlikhob]^_ng]bg`mhlfZeeZg]f^]bnf^gm^kikbl^l'
Finally, during the crisis, the UK authorities had engaged in a massive bail-out of 
banks using taxpayers money. Hence, banking regulation became politically salient 
for politicians and public opinion in the UK (Howarth and Quaglia 2013).
British policy-makers were partial foot-draggers concerning the setting up of the 
European Supervisory Authorities, given the British reluctance to transfer powers 
away from national supervisors to bodies outside their borders (Financial Times, 
20 March 2009), thereby granting decision-making powers to EU-level authorities 
while public funds to tackle banking crises came from national budgets. To this ef-
fect, Gordon Brown, the British Prime Minister, secured a guarantee that the new 
supervisory system would not include powers to force national governments to bail 
out banks (Buckley and Howarth 2011).
UK policy-makers were (constructive) fence-sitters on other EU legislative meas-
ures, such as the European Market Infrastructure regulation (EMIR) (James 2015). 
On this piece of legislation, UK preferences were mostly in line with those of the 
other member states and the measures proposed by the Commission. The EMIR 
prescribed the shifting of OTCDs trading to central counterparties (CCPs) and the 
mandatory reporting of transactions to trade repositories. It also set harmonised 
rules for CCPs and trade repositories, which would be subject to EU supervision. 
There were two controversial issues for the UK in the negotiations of the EMIR. 
First, there was the complex third-country regime for CCPs and trade reposito-
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ries. Without going into much detail, the British authorities were keen to ensure 
open markets by setting broad criteria to ascertain the equivalence of the regula-
tory framework of third countries. They also objected to the concept of reciprocity 
proposed by the Commission and supported by France (see Pagliari 2013; Quaglia 
2015). 
The second controversial issue for the UK was the provisions concerning the loca-
tion of CCPs and their access to central bank liquidity. Some regulators  notably 
the French  believed that CCPs clearing OTCDs should have access to central bank 
liquidity in the same currency as the product being cleared. In other words, a CCP 
would have to be located in the euro area and clear euro-denominated products in 
order to access European Central Bank (ECB) liquidity. The British authorities suc-
cessfully opposed this view because London is one of the main locations for deriva-
tives trading and clearing worldwide, also for euro-denominated assets (Buckley, 
Howarth and Quaglia 2012). The measures initially proposed would have be detri-
f^gmZemhma^\e^Zkbg`ahnl^leh\Zm^]hnmlb]^ma^^nkhZk^Z¦klmZg]_hk^fhlm%
those currently operating in the London OTCD markets (Risk Magazine, 10 January 
2011).  
On bank resolution, the UK was a pace-setter. The Bank Recovery and Resolution 
Directive (BRRD) was controversial in the EU and was therefore issued with con-
siderable delay: it was agreed in 2014, even though the Commission began con-
sulting on cross-border bank resolution as early as 2009 (Commission 2009) and 
held two successive consultations (Commission 2011, 2013). It was a matter that 
mhn\a^]nihgihebmb\Zeerl^glbmbo^blln^lZg]aZ]ihm^gmbZe¦l\Zebfieb\Zmbhgl'Ma^
UK authorities actively contributed to the policy debate by developing the concept 
of the bail-in and loss-absorbing capacity that were new resolution tools devised 
post-crisis. The idea of bail-in was initially put forward by two senior economists of 
Credit Suisse, Paul Calello and Wilson Ervin, in an article in The Economist in Janu-
ary 2010. It immediately gained traction at the Bank of England because the tradi-
tional way to resolve banks was seen as unsuitable for large cross-border banks, 
especially Globally Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs). 
As early as July 2010, Andrew Bailey (2010), who later became the director respon-
lb[e^_hk¦gZg\bZelmZ[bebmrZmma^;Zgdh_>g`eZg]%Zk`n^]maZmZgZem^kgZmbo^phkma
exploring, drawing on the tools used to restructure non-banks, is creditor recapi-
talisation, or bail-in. In September 2010, Tucker (2010a) reiterated that the bail-
in should be considered as a resolution tool. In December 2010, well before the 
Financial Stability Bond (FSB) included the bail-in in the Key Attributes, and well 
before the BRRD (2014), the Financial Stability Report of the Bank of England (Bank 
of England 2010) stated that the bail-in should be extended to other potentially sys-
temic institutions, including investment banks and market infrastructures. The In-
dependent Commission on Banking (the so-called Vickers Commission) (2011 a,b) 
recommended statutory bail-in powers and a loss-absorbing capacity of at least 
17%-20%, which was broadly in line with the standard subsequently on loss absor-
bency capacity set by the FSB in 2015. 
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MZ[e^+3Ho^kob^ph_ihlm&\kblbl>N¦gZg\bZek^`neZmbhg#
Regulatory change in the EU:
- new rules introduced
- existing rules amended
- institutions established or reformed
Content of new or amended rules
Banking
Deposit Guarantee Scheme (DGS) Directive 
amended (2008)
DGS Directive revised (2014)
Capital Requirements Directive IV (2013)
Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
(BRRD) (2014)
Minimum level of coverage for deposits 
increased; payment time reduced
Harmonisation of coverage, simpliication of 
payout, ex-ante scheme
Deinition and level of capital, leverage ratio, 
liquidity rules, bonuses
Harmonise resolution rule, set up new tools 
(notably, bail-in) and improve cross-border 
cooperation
Securities and Investment Funds
Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) 
(2009)
Directive on Alternative Investment Funds 
Managers (AIFMs) (2011)
Regulation on OTC derivatives, central 
counterparties and trade repositories (EMIR) 
(2012)
CRAs compulsory registration and compliance 
with rules concerning conlict of interest and 
quality of rating
Legally binding authorisation and supervisory 
regime for all AIFMs, European passport for 
AIFMs
Reporting obligation for OTC derivatives to 
trade repositories, clearing obligation for 
standardised OTC derivatives through CCPs, 
common rules for CCPs and trade repositories
Institutional Framework for Regulation and Supervision
Directives on ESRB, ESFS and ESAs (2010) Transformation of level-3 Lamfalussy 
committees into European Authorities; 
creation of a European System of Financial 
Supervisors at micro-prudential level and of 
the European Systemic Risk Board dealing 
with macro-prudential oversight
*MablmZ[e^k^ihkmlma^fZbgib^\^lh_>Nihlm&\kblbl¦gZg\bZee^`bleZmbhgZ]him^]%bm
does not include soft law and legislation proposed but not adopted.
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Banking Union
BU was the main (and delayed) response of the euro area to the sovereign debt cri-
sis that began in Greece in 2010 and subsequently extended to Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain. When the crisis threatened to extend to Italy, BU was proposed, even though 
ma^¦gZeo^klbhgh_;NZ`k^^]ble^llZf[bmbhnlmaZgmaZmpab\apZlbgbmbZeerieZgg^]
(on the politics of BU, see Donnelly 2015; Epstein and Rhodes 2016; Schafer 2016). In 
June 2012, the President of the European Council, the President of the Eurogroup, 
the President of the Commission and the President of the ECB jointly presented an 
interim report, entitled Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union, that 
laid the foundations for BU. Afterwards, the various components of BU were set in 
place, with one important exception. 
The Regulation for the establishment of a Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
was adopted in October 2013. The SSM applies only to the euro area member 
states and to the non-euro area member states that decide to join BU. In the SSM 
responsibility for banking supervision was assigned to the ECB in cooperation with 
national competent authorities (see Howarth and Quaglia 2013). This was followed 
by the adoption of the BRRD in June 2014 (discussed in the previosu section) and 
the Regulation on the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) in July 2014. The SRM, 
which was to complement the SSM, was responsible for the planning and resolu-
tion phases of cross-border banks and those directly supervised by the ECB, while 
national resolution authorities would be responsible for all other banks. 
Ma^k^obl^]=L@]bk^\mbo^pZl¦gZebl^] bgCng^+)*-%[nmZ\hffhg>N]^ihlbm
guarantee scheme did not materialise, mainly because of German opposition. In 
November 2015 the Commission launched a proposed regulation for the creation 
of a European DGS. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM)  which was estab-
ebla^][rZg bgm^k`ho^kgf^gmZe mk^Zmr¦gZebl^] bg+)*+ mhk^ieZ\^ma^m^fihkZkr
European Financial Stability Facility  began operation in September 2012. It was 
^goblZ`^]maZm%ln[c^\mmh\^kmZbg\hg]bmbhgl%ma^>LF\hne]ikhob]^¦gZg\bZelni-
port to ailing banks as well as to the governments of countries experiencing severe 
¦gZg\bZe]b\nemb^l'
;NpZl]^lb`g^]mhk^[nbe]¦gZg\bZefZkd^m\hg¦]^g\^bg[hma[ZgdlZg]lho^k-
eigns  especially in the euro area periphery  by stabilising the national banking 
systems exposed directly to a vicious circle. In fact, the sovereign debt crisis cre-
ated a doom-loop between the instability of the banking sector  which had to be 
[Zbe^]hnmbgma^fZchkbmrh_^nkhZk^Z\hngmkb^lZg]ma^_kZ`bebmrh_in[eb\¦gZg\-
es, which were becoming unsustainable in some countries (Howarth and Quaglia 
+)*,"';NpZlZelhmhk^o^kl^ma^_kZ`f^gmZmbhgh_>nkhi^Zg¦gZg\bZefZkd^mlmaZm
aZ][^`ngpbmama^bgm^kgZmbhgZe¦gZg\bZe\kblblZg]pZlphkl^g^][rma^lho^k-
eign debt crisis. BU transferred powers from the national to the EU (to be precise, 
ma^;N"e^o^e'BmpZlZelhlb`gb¦\Zgm[^\Znl^ghmZee>Nf^f[^klmZm^lchbg^]3bmbg-
cluded only euro area member states, even if other EU member states were able to 
himbg'A^g\^%;Nbg\k^Zl^]ma^mk^g]mhpZk]l]b^k^gmbZm^]bgm^`kZmbhgbgma^>N
(Dyson and Sepos 2010; Schimmelfennig 2016; Schimmefennig et al. 2016), which 
ihl^]ZfZchk\aZee^g`^mhma^>NZlZpahe^Zg]mhma^him&hnm\hngmkb^l¦klm
Zg]_hk^fhlmma^ND%`bo^gma^lbs^h_bml¦gZg\bZel^\mhkZg]bmlbgm^k\hgg^\mbhgmh
the euro area. Non-euro area countries had a choice about joining (or not) the SSM 
and faced incentives and disincentives.
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The UK was a constructive fence-sitter on BU: it was by and large supportive of BU 
Zg]li^\b¦\Zeerma^LLF_hk^nkhZk^Zf^f[^klmZm^l%ghmZ[erZlZpZrmhmZ\de^
the sovereign debt crisis that was distressing the euro area periphery and to en-
lnk^¦gZg\bZelmZ[bebmrma^k^bg!l^^%_hk^qZfie^% The Telegraph, 13 December 2012, 
19 December 2012). In the midst of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area Os-
borne called for permanent changes to stabilise the euro area in the medium and 
long term (BBC 21 July 2011; Financial Times 20 July 2011). He supported greater 
aZkfhgblZmbhgh_¦l\Zeiheb\b^lbgma^^ nkhZk^Z%Zk`nbg`maZmma^k^pZlZk^fhkl^-
e^lleh`b\_hkZ[Zgdbg`Zg]¦l\Zengbhgbgma^^nkhZk^Z'A^lmk^ll^]maZmma^ND
ghmphne][^iZkmh_maZmngbhg[nmphne]k^jnbk^lZ_^`nZk]lmhikhm^\mbml¦gZg-
cial industry. The UK did not want to be part of BU because of domestic politics and 
domestic political economy considerations. BU implied a considerable pooling of 
ihp^kZmma^>N(;Ne^o^e%¦klmZg]_hk^fhlmma^lnikZgZmbhgZeblZmbhgh_[Zgdbg`
supervision, which was politically unacceptable in the UK. Moreover, the institu-
tional and decision-making framework of BU was primarily designed for euro area 
members  and in fact none of non-euro area countries joined it. 
As for domestic political economy, the British banking system was not only the 
most Europeanised of the largest six EU member state banking systems in terms 
of the holdings of other EU-headquartered banks in the UK (as both a percentage 
and in total terms) and British bank holdings elsewhere in the EU (in total terms), 
it was also very internationalised in terms of non-EU headquartered banks active in 
the UK and the activities of British banks abroad. The UK was most exposed to the 
ihm^gmbZebglmZ[bebmrh_`eh[Zeerlrlm^fb\[Zgdl%pab\aZ^\m^]ma^;kbmbla[Zgdbg`
system more in relative terms than others in Europe (Howarth and Quaglia 2016). 
British banks by and large supported the creation of the SSM, but none sought Brit-
ish participation (British Bankers Association 2012). 
During the negotiations on Banking Union, British policy-makers feared that a euro 
area majority would be able to impose its rules on non-euro area members in the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) (Financial Times, 13 December 2012). Hence, 
they demanded an EBA voting reform, whereby any decision by the Authority 
should be approved by a minimum number of member states outside BU and thus 
^^\mbo^er[rZ]hn[e^fZchkbmrh_f^f[^klmZm^lbglb]^Zg]hnmlb]^ma^;N'Lhf^
^nkhZk^Zf^f[^klmZm^l%¦klmZg]_hk^fhlm?kZg\^Zg]@^kfZgr%k^lblm^];kbmbla
requests and eventually an agreement was reached on the creation of a double 
majority system until the number of non-BU member states dwindled to less than 
four. However, the safeguard in EBA will end once the number of non-BU member 
states is less than four (Howarth and Quaglia 2016). All in all, the UK was a construc-
mbo^_^g\^&lbmm^khg;NZg]\Zk^_neerg^`hmbZm^]li^\b¦\blln^lmaZmp^k^lb`gb¦\Zgm
for  non-euro area countries. 
;NpbeeaZo^lb`gb¦\Zgmbfieb\Zmbhgl_hkma^lbg`e^¦gZg\bZefZkd^m'?bklm%bmpbeebg-
\k^Zl^¦gZg\bZebgm^`kZmbhgbgma^^ nkhZk^Z%a^g\^\k^Zmbg`ZfZkd^mpbmabgZfZk-
ket. Second, BU will promote the formation of a coalition of member states with 
similar interests and hence potentially voting as a block on several issues concern-
bg`>N¦gZg\bZe![Zgdbg`"k^`neZmbhg'Ma^ ]hn[e^fZchkbmrlZ_^`nZk]bg>;:maZm
^nkhZk^Zhnmlb]^kl%¦klmZg]_hk^fhlmma^ND%h[mZbgpbee^g]hg\^ma^gnf[^k
of non-BU member states is less than four and there is no such safeguard in the 
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Council of Ministers.  Third, and related to the previous point, there is a potentially 
uneasy relation between the European Banking Authority, which remains responsi-
ble for developing regulatory policy and technical standards for the single rulebook 
in banking across Europe, and the SSM, which has the ECB at its centre and was 
given regulatory powers in addition to supervisory powers.
The building of CMU 
Ma^b]^Zh_<FNpZl¦klmf^gmbhg^]bgma^Ihebmb\Ze@nb]^ebg^lh_ma^!ma^g"g^per
appointed President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, in Octo-
ber 2014 (European Commission 2014). The project of CMU was fully in line with the 
Investment Plan for Europe (aka the Juncker plan) of November 2014, which set 
out to remove obstacles to investment, providing funding and technical assistance 
to investment projects. According to the Commission, CMU would improve the 
¦gZg\bg`h_ma^^\hghfr\nmma^\hlmh_kZblbg`\ZibmZe%ghmZ[er_hkLF>l%Zg]
help reduce the very high dependence on bank funding. This would also increase 
the attractiveness of Europe as a place to invest (European Commission 2014: 8). 
In February 2015, the Commission (2015a) published the Green Paper, Building a 
Capital Markets Union, which was subject to a public consultation. At this stage, 
CMU was a mixed bag  it was a long shopping list of things to do in order to 
\hfie^m^ma^lbg`e^¦gZg\bZefZkd^mZg][hhlm>Nl\ZibmZefZkd^ml'BgL^im^f[^k
2015, the Commission (2015b) put forward an Action Plan for CMU, together with 
a package of two legislative proposals to promote securitisation. Furthermore, the 
Commission began preparing a proposal for the revision of the Prospectus direc-
tive and the Solvency II directive. Finally, it opened a consultation on venture capi-
tal and social entrepreneurship funds, a consultation on covered bonds in the EU 
Zg]Z\Zee_hk^ob]^g\^hgZg>Nk^`neZmhkr_kZf^phkd_hk¦gZg\bZel^kob\^l'Ma^
member states reached an agreement on the securitisation proposals in a matter 
of weeks, but the EP refused to fast-track the proposals mainly because left-leaning 
MEPs called for a thorough review in order not to revive pre-crisis excesses (Finan-
cial Times, 3 March 2016).
The European Commission was the main policy entrepreneur on CMU, which was 
enthusiastically supported by the UK, joined by those member states with the 
fhlmp^ee&]^o^ehi^]Zg]]bo^klb¦^]¦gZg\bZel^\mhkl%bg\en]bg`Bk^eZg]!+)*."%ma^
Netherlands (2015), Sweden (2015) and Luxembourg (2015). These member states 
unequivocally supported the market liberalisation agenda in CMU. The main con-
tinental countries  notably France and Germany (Schäuble and Sapin 2015)  ex-
pressed their reservations on CMU and so did some of their domestic players (e.g. 
]hf^lmb\[ZgdlZg]bgo^lmf^gm¦kfl"';r\hgmkZlm%ma^fhlm\hfi^mbmbo^iZkmlh_
ma^¦gZg\bZebg]nlmkr%ma^fZbgmkZglgZmbhgZeieZr^kl%ln\aZleZk`^[Zgdl^g`Z`^]
bgl^\nkbmblZmbhg%bglnkZg\^\hfiZgb^lZg]ma^bgm^kgZmbhgZe¦gZg\bZe\^gmk^lbgma^
>N%¦klmZg]_hk^fhlmma^<bmrh_Ehg]hg%p^k^lniihkmbo^'Ma^g^pf^Zlnk^l]^-
lb`g^]mhikhfhm^l^\nkbmblZmbhgphne][^g^¦mma^eZk`^[Zgdl[Zl^]bgma^ND%[nm
also in France, Germany, the Benelux countries, Italy and Spain. Small banks would 
[^g^¦m _khfma^g^pikhihl^] e^`bleZmbhghgl^\nkbmblZmbhg%[nmma^ eZk`^[Zgdl
phne][^g^¦mma^fhlm%Zlma^rZk^ma^fhlm^g`Z`^]bglaZ]hp[Zgdbg`!@Z[hk
and Westergaard 2015).  
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The proposed revision of the Solvency II directive, de facto reduced solvency re-
quirements for insurers that invest in long-term infrastructural projects. It would 
[^g^¦mbglnk^kl% bgiZkmb\neZkma^eZk`^hg^l%pab\ap^k^fhk^ebd^ermhbgo^lm bg
these sort of activities. Large insurers are mainly based in the UK, but also to a 
e^ll^k[nmlmbeelb`gb¦\Zgm^qm^gmbg@^kfZgr%?kZg\^Zg]BmZer'Ma^k^oblbhgh_ma^
Prospectus directive and future legislative and non-legislative measures designed 
to harmonise securities market legislation and ease cross border activities would 
[^ iZkmb\neZker Z]oZgmZ`^hnl _hk ma^ eZk`^lm% fhlm \hfi^mbmbo^ ¦gZg\bZe \^gmk^l%
¦klmZg]_hk^fhlmma^<bmrh_Ehg]hg%maZmphne][^Z[e^mhZmmkZ\m[nlbg^ll_khf
the periphery of the EU, but also potentially from Paris and Frankfurt (Quaglia et 
al. 2016). 
British policy-makers were pace-setters on CMU, at least compared to other mem-
ber states. First, a British national, Jonathan Hill, was chosen to lead the CMU pro-
ject at the European Commission and was appointed as Commissioner for Finan-
cial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union, one of the few examples 
in European Union history where a Commissioners job title matched that of a spe-
\b¦\ikhc^\m'L^\hg]%NDiheb\r&fZd^klZg]lmZd^ahe]^kl^g`Z`^]^qm^glbo^er bg
the agenda-setting process. For example, almost a quarter of the Commissions 
k^lihgl^lmh\hglnemZmbhgp^k^_khfma^ND%*/_khf;^e`bnf!>N&e^o^e¦gZg\bZe
associations are located in Brussels), 13% each from France and Germany, and 4% 
each from Italy and the Netherlands. The House of Lords (2015) produced a timely 
report on CMU, urging the the UK, where capital markets are better established 
than in other Member States, to take the lead in spearheading this Capital Markets 
Union. Third, the areas prioritised for action, namely securitisation (banking), Sol-
vency II (insurance) and Prospectus (securities markets), were those that would 
[^g^¦mma^NDma^fhlmZg]bg]^^]p^k^bg]b\Zm^][rma^ND`ho^kgf^gmZlma^
three top priorities for action on CMU (UK response to Green Paper 2015). The call 
_hk^ob]^g\^hgZg>Nk^`neZmhkr_kZf^phkd_hk¦gZg\bZel^kob\^lZelh\abf^]p^ee
pbma;kbmbla\hg\^kglZ[hnmma^>Nlho^k&k^`neZmbhg_heehpbg`ma^bgm^kgZmbhgZe¦-
nancial crisis. Furthermore, the strong UK government opposition to further cen-
tralisation helps to explain the absence of institutional measures in both the Febru-
ary 2015 Green Paper and the September 2015 Action Plan (Véron, 2015). 
H_Zee>Nf^f[^klmZm^l%ma^NDaZ]ma^fhlmihm^gmbZeermh[^g^¦m_khfma^¦gZg-
\bZeeb[^kZeblZmbhgZg]]bo^klb¦\Zmbhgikhfbl^]bgma^<FNikhc^\m%`bo^gma^]bo^k-
lbmrh_ bml¦gZg\bZel^\mhkZg]% bgiZkmb\neZk% ma^ab`a\hg\^gmkZmbhgh_pahe^lZe^
market activity, private equity and hedge funds (Véron, 2014). As noted by Dawson 
(2015):
If a single capital market is established, demand for funding will 
be Europe-wide, but supply will be dominated by the City. The 
iheb\rieZrlik^\bl^ermh;kbmZbglZk^Zh_^qi^kmbl^'ND¦gZg\bZe
services could provide the funding for businesses and investment 
projects across a £10 trillion market  a move potentially as trans-
formational as the Big Bang in 1986. This is not something that 
can be replicated outside the EU. What would give capital mar-
kets union its power is the sheer scale of the European market.
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In a speech made to the City of London Corporation Policy Committee, Commis-
lbhg^k Abee ghm^] maZm _khf a^k^ bgo^lmf^gm §hpl hnm Z\khll ma^ \hgmbg^gm3 ND
[Zgdle^g]fhk^maZg+mkbeebhgbgmhhma^k>nkhi^Zg\hngmkb^lFhk^maZgZmabk]
of UK private equity funds investments go to companies elsewhere in the EU. So 
the success of the City is tied to a successful Europe.
In the UK, given the fact that CMU would also involve new EU regulation and further 
centralisation, there was some reluctance to proceed on the basis of national sov-
ereignty (Véron 2014). In its responses to the Commissions consultation on CMU, 
the UK government (2015) opposed: the transfer of direct supervisory responsibili-
ties to European institutions and tax and solvency law harmonisation. This might 
Zelh^qieZbgma^lhf^paZm]b^k^gmob^plh_<hffbllbhg^kAbeeZg]<hffbllbhg
President Juncker as to the institutional content of CMU. Commissioner Hill and 
the Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Mar-
d^mlNgbhg!=@?BLF:"h\bZel]b]ghm]bl\nllbglmbmnmbhgZek^_hkfbgma^bkik^l-
entations on CMU. By contrast, President Juncker in the Five Presidents Report 
(2015) argued that CMU should lead ultimately to a single European capital mar-
kets supervisor. Hence, domestic political economy and domestic politics in the 
NDinee^]bglhf^paZm]b^k^gm]bk^\mbhglpbmak^_^k^g\^mh<FN'
@bo^gma^bfieb\Zmbhglh_;N_hkma^lbg`e^¦gZg\bZefZkd^m!l^^L^\mbhg-"%<FN
was deliberately framed as an initiative to complement BU and ultimately to com-
plete EMU (see Juncker 2015), even though CMU involves all the 28 member states. 
Some commentators (for example, Ringe, 2015: 5) interpret CMU, in part, as an at-
tempt to repair the strained relations between the UK and the EU/euro area by giv-
ing a political signal to strengthen the Single Market as a project of all 28 Member 
States, not only to the euro area countries, and in an area where the UK had a clear 
competitive advantage. Hence, CMU was designed to attract the support of those 
f^f[^klmZm^lmaZmaZ]ghmchbg^];NZg](hk>FN!¦klmZg]_hk^fhlm%ma^ND"'
A^g\^%bmpZlZpZrmhZ]]k^llma^\hg\^kglh_ma^k^i^k\nllbhglh_]b^k^gmbZm^]
bgm^`kZmbhgebgd^]mh>FN¦klmZg];Nhgma^lbg`e^¦gZg\bZefZkd^m'
Conclusion
The UK has been a key player in the post-crisis reforms of European economic 
Zg]¦gZg\bZe `ho^kgZg\^%Ze[^bm bg]b^k^gmpZrlZg]pbmaoZkrbg` bgm^glbmr'Ma^
!Zm mbf^l \hglb]^kZ[e^" ;kbmbla bg§n^g\^ pZl `^Zk^] mhpZk]l ma^ ZmmZbgf^gm h_
ik^_^k^g\^lmaZmp^k^laZi^][r]hf^lmb\ihebmb\lZg]ihebmb\Ze^\hghfr%¦klmZg]
_hk^fhlmma^bgm^k^lmlh_ma^¦gZg\bZel^kob\^lbg]nlmkrZg]ma^<bmrh_Ehg]hg'Ma^
UK was mostly a foot-dragger (with important exceptions) on the market-shaping 
ihlm&\kblbl>N¦gZg\bZel^kob\^lk^`neZmbhg%ngebd^bgma^ik^obhnli^kbh]pa^gma^
ND aZ] [^^g Z iZ\^&l^mm^k bg ma^ \hfie^mbhg h_ ma^ lbg`e^ ¦gZg\bZe fZkd^m% gh-
tably the so-called Lamfalussy directives on securities markets and Solvency II in 
insurance. The UK was a (constructive) fence-sitter on BU, unlike in the making of 
EMU, which the UK had tried to block, acting as a foot-dragger. Finally, the UK was 
a pace-setter on CMU very much in the same way it had been in the completion of 
ma^lbg`e^¦gZg\bZefZkd^mbgik^obhnl]^\Z]^l'Manl%ma^NDlniihkm^]>N¦gZg-
\bZeiheb\rf^Zlnk^lpa^g^o^kma^rk^§^\m^]ma^;kbmblafZkd^m&fZdbg`ZiikhZ\a
!l^^JnZ`ebZ+)*)Z%[%+)*."Zg]aZ]^\hghfb\[^g^¦ml_hkma^<bmrh_Ehg]hg'Ma^
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main exception was the BRRD, which had a considerable British input but no direct 
[^g^¦m_hkma^¦gZg\bZebg]nlmkr'Ma^NDhiihl^]>Niheb\rf^Zlnk^lmaZmp^k^
^q\^llbo^erfZkd^m&laZibg`Zg]p^k^ma^k^_hk^o^kr[nk]^glhf^_hkma^¦gZg\bZe
industry, especially the City. The main exception was the CRD IV, whereby the UK 
was in favour of stricter EU rules (see James 2015, 2016). The UK was a fence-sitter 
on issues that mainly concerned the euro area, albeit paying attention to the impli-
cations of those measures for non-euro area members (see Howarth and Quaglia 
2016).  
The result of the British referendum on continuing membership of the EU repre-
sents a turning point in the relationship between the UK and the EU. The economic 
Zg]ihebmb\Ze^ ^\mlh_;k^qbmpbee[^_Zkk^Z\abg`_hkma^NDZg]ma^>N':emahn`ama^
events are still unfolding, Brexit raises a set of important questions to address with 
k^_^k^g\^mhma^¦gZg\bZeiheb\b^l]bl\nll^]bgmabliZi^k3paZmZk^ma^bfieb\Zmbhgl
of Brexit for the UK and what are the implications of Brexit for the EU? Since the UK 
opted out of EMU, declined to join BU but was a full member of the Single Financial 
FZkd^m%ma^bfiZ\mh_;k^qbmpbee[^_^emikbg\biZeerhgZ\\^llmhma^lbg`e^¦gZg\bZe
fZkd^mZg]hgblln^lk^eZm^]mh¦gZg\bZek^`neZmbhg'Fn\apbee]^i^g]hgma^g^p
relationship put in place between the UK and the EU. 
;kbmblaZnmahkbmb^lZg]ma^ND¦gZg\bZel^\mhk_Z\^Z]be^ffZbgma^;k^qbmg^`hmbZ-
mbhgl'Hgma^hg^aZg]%b_ma^NDehl^lngk^lmkb\m^]Z\\^llmhma^lbg`e^¦gZg\bZe
fZkd^m%ND&[Zl^]¦gZg\bZe^gmbmb^lZg]Z\mbobmb^lpbeeg^^]mhk^eh\Zm^iZkmermhma^
\hgmbg^gmbghk]^kmh\hgmbgn^mh[^g^¦m_khfiZllihkmbg`Z\khllma^>N!maZmZi-
ieb^lhgermhlhf^¦gZg\bZel^kob\^l"'Fhk^ho^k%ma^NDpbeeghehg`^kl^ko^Zlma^
fZbgihbgmh_^gmkrbgmhma^>N_hkmabk]&\hngmkr¦gZg\bZe^gmbmb^lZg]ikh]n\ml%
which will likely therefore choose to place a range of operations in other EU mem-
ber states to secure access to the passport. Finally, the UK will no longer be able to 
\aZee^g`^ma^^hkmlh_ma^>nkhi^Zg<^gmkZe;ZgdZg]Zgnf[^kh_hma^kf^f[^k
states to transfer euro clearing to the euro area. 
Hgma^hma^kaZg]%b_ngk^lmkb\m^]Z\\^llmhma^lbg`e^¦gZg\bZefZkd^mblk^mZbg^]%
ma^ ND pbee aZo^ mh \hgmbgn^ mh \hfier pbma >N ¦gZg\bZe k^`neZmbhg hg pab\a bm
\^Zl^lmhaZo^Z]bk^\mlZrbgiheb\r&Zg]eZp&fZdbg`'Bgma^iZlm%ma^ND¦gZg\bZe
l^\mhk_k^jn^gmer\hfieZbg^]Z[hnm^q\^llbo^er[nk]^glhf^>N¦gZg\bZek^`neZ-
mbhg':lmabliZi^kaZlZk`n^]%bgl^o^kZe¦gZg\bZeiheb\rZk^Zl%ma^NDaZlpb^e]^]
\hglb]^kZ[e^ bg§n^g\^ bg \Zeb[kZmbg` !Zm mbf^l% mhgbg` ]hpg" >N ¦gZg\bZe kne^l'
A^g\^%>N¦gZg\bZek^`neZmbhgblebd^ermh[^]b^k^gmbgma^_nmnk^pbmahnmma^NDl
fZkd^m&fZdbg`ZiikhZ\a%Zg]pbeeebd^erfZd^>Nkne^le^lllnbmZ[e^_hkma^¦gZg-
cial industry based in the City. Moreover, euro area member states will tend to 
]^o^ehili^\b¦\ik^_^k^g\^lhg[bg]bg`m^\agb\ZelmZg]Zk]lhglni^koblbhg!^m\'"
through their cooperation in BU. 
Ma^ >N Zelh _Z\^l Z ;k^qbm ]be^ffZ' :gr li^\bZe ]^Ze _hk ma^ ¦gZg\bZe l^kob\^l
sector in the UK is politically unpalatable for the EU because it would give the UK 
bfihkmZgm[^g^¦mlh_>Nf^f[^klabi%gZf^er%ngk^lmkb\m^]Z\\^llmhma^lbg`e^
¦gZg\bZefZkd^m% bg\en]bg`iZllihkmbg`' Bmphne][^ma^dbg]h_ ib\dZg]\ahhl ^
approach that so far has been ruled out by the EU, whereas the UK authorities tend 
mhli^Zdh_Z[^lihd^]^Ze'Ma^k^fb`amZelh[^Zihebmb\ZemkZ]^&h[^mp^^gma^
four freedoms, in particular, the freedom of movement of people (including con-
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mkheh_bffb`kZmbhg"Zg]ma^_k^^\bk\neZmbhgh_¦gZg\bZel^kob\^lZg]\ZibmZe':mma^
lZf^mbf^%ma^<bmrbl[r_Zkma^fZbg¦gZg\bZe\^gmk^bg>nkhi^%lhma^k^fb`am[^
incentives to retain it in the single market. Furthermore, many continental banks, 
insurers and securities dealers operate in London. For both the EU and the UK, it 
will be a challenging circle to square.
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